Abstract: This paper employs economic analysis to analyze the reaction of an incumbent firm, the Roman Catholic Church, to the entry of rivals, Protestant sects, selling alternative forms of the Z-good "religious services." This event, called the Counter-Reformation or the Catholic Reformation, came in the form of predictable economic responses, including (a) lowering the average price of the Z-good; (b) vigorous competition in the neighborhood of the entrants' "price"; (c) raising rivals' marginal costs to motivate demanders return to Catholicism, and (d) attempts to enhance demand in the "retail" market while simultaneously protecting rent-seeking practices in the "wholesale" market. We argue that the advent of Protestant entry (despite conflicting adjurations of the Council of Trent) was met with violent, and nominal rather than fundamental, doctrinal alterations. More generally, we maintain that economic theory is a useful platform on which to evaluate the history of religion.
INTRODUCTION
Although it has not been universally applauded, the extension of economics into new domains of social behavior has become increasingly commonplace. Economic tools have now been applied to areas of human behavior as diverse as art, culture, marriage, and sumo wrestling. For some economists, one of the most intriguing of these "new" realms of inquiry is the economics of religion, a subject that relies on principles of rational behavior, interest-group analysis, public-choice and game theory to explain church membership as well as changes in religious institutions (e.g., Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Iannaccone 1998) . Our previous contributions to this burgeoning literature have focused on the economics of the medieval church. In earlier studies we treated the medieval church as an economic firm in order to better understand the formation of religious doctrine Tollison 1989, 1992) ; the industrial organization and rent-seeking practices of the medieval church (Ekelund, et al 1996) ; and most recently, competitive entry into the medieval religious market (Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison 2002) .
From a historical perspective the landmark change in religious institutions was the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, which eventually produced permanent changes in religious markets. In a former study, we analyzed this event as a form of market entry and showed that the Protestant Reformation (1517-1555) was a consequence of both demand-side and supply-side factors (Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison 2002) . This paper takes the next logical step-it seeks to analyze the historical response to competitive entry of an incumbent firm, the medieval Catholic Church, by explicit reference to what historians and scholars refer to as the "Counter-Reformation," or, alternatively, the "Catholic Reformation" . 1 We maintain that as a dominant firm the Roman Catholic Church responded to market entry in a way predicted by economic theory. After Protestantism gained a foothold in the religious market, the Catholic Church faced a residual demand curve that was composed of more inelastic demanders. Consequently, it (a) lowered the average price of providing the Z-good "religious services"; (b) engaged in vigorous competition in the neighborhood of the new entrant's "price"; (c) attempted to raise rivals' marginal costs to move demanders back to Catholicism; and (d) tried to boost demand in its "retail" market, while simultaneously protecting and even intensifying its rent-seeking practices in its "wholesale" market. 2 In sum, the Roman Catholic Church responded to Protestant entry and to the encroaching "age of reason" with violence, and nominal, rather than fundamental, doctrinal alterations.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE REFORMATION REVISITED
After centuries of Roman persecution, the Catholic Church entered an era of ascendancy, during which it strove to achieve dominance against other world religions.
In this early era, church doctrine was disparate and unsettled, and church management was loose and geographically dispersed. The Edict of Milan (313 A. D.) bestowed primary authority over church matters to bishops, who supervised the priests and monks that operated at the "retail" level. In this phase of operations the pope was simply the Bishop of Rome, considered as "first among equals" in church governance. On the moral front, the concept of "sinful behavior" was largely a matter of particularized interpretation. Early penitential doctrines-directives concerning faith and morals issued by prelates and bishops-were often incongruent. Although probably effective at the local level, the quasi-monopoly position of the Roman Catholic Church was weak and incomplete on a global level. 3 Importantly, the Bishop of Rome did not have the power to monitor behavior at the lower administrative levels of the church, nor did he have the 2 While these terms are conventional in business and economics, their application to a religious institution is not. Hence, we note that by "retail" we mean direct sales to church customers, whereas by "wholesale"
we refer to the structure of internal transactions of the institutional church, such as dealings between bishops and lower clergy.
power to enforce papal decisions. In fact, secular powers persistently challenged the Church for important appointment authority involving bishops and abbots.
By the twelfth century the religious landscape had changed dramatically, due in large measure to a papal revolution that allowed the Bishop of Rome to transcend his fellow bishops in power and authority. Pope Gregory VII reorganized the Catholic
Church under the auspices of the Concordat of Worms in 1122, which established the pope as the supreme judicial and legislative authority within the Catholic Church.
Thereafter, all property rights of the church came under the pope's control. All testamentary cases were adjudicable in Rome, giving the pope control over thirty to forty percent of the cultivated land in Europe. In addition, the twelfth-century church was able to temporarily wrest control over ecclesiastical and monastic appointments from civil authorities (i.e., the so-called "investiture" controversy). The new ascendancy of the church was made possible by a number of factors, among them decreased costs of transportation and communication, the steady "Christianization" of the Low Countries and Germany, and the weakness of monarchical governments throughout Europe, caused by the ascendance of local fiefdoms.
The result, which we emphasized in an earlier study (Ekelund et al., 1996) , was the establishment of the Catholic Church as a dominant firm in the religious market of Europe between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. The medieval church became, for all practical purposes, a vertically integrated, M-form corporation, with a long-term planning horizon (in contrast to the regional and monarchical governments of the time).
This vertically integrated firm evolved into a powerful, rent-seeking monopoly, exercising upstream monitoring, auditing and rule-setting functions, and operating downstream retail divisions that sold "assurances of eternal salvation" and other religious services. Some of the major monopoly "projects" undertaken by the medieval church at this time included the following:
♦ The establishment of the papal camera or treasury, which was empowered to collect rents from downstream levels of administration and to act as papal enforcer, carrying out inspections with powers of excommunication and interdict against malfeasors.
♦ Upstream rule setting and adjudication in matters such as capital market functioning (e.g., usury laws) and marriage markets (virtually taking over the marriage market from civil authorities);
♦ The creation and manipulation of doctrine at the upstream level in order to increase church revenues by price discrimination. Among these actions were the virtual invention of purgatory (which has no explicit Biblical basis), the requirement of auricular confession to a priest, and the creation of an "indulgence system" whereby payments and other sacrifices could reduce the penitential time served by individuals in purgatory.
♦ The launching, in the twelfth century, of crusades to the Holy Land and against heretics to defend the credibility of the Catholic Church's product(s);
By mid-sixteenth century, as one scholar put it, the church had "sheared too much wool from the sheep." Its doctrinal manipulations, complex reward and punishment schemes, and monopoly price discrimination combined to push certain consumers to the limits of their demands for the Church's product. Ongoing capture of greater amounts of See McNeill and Gamer (1990: 197) .
consumer surplus by the Roman Catholic Church made market entry by rival firms feasible because elastic demanders-those paying high prices with little or no consumer surplus-were inclined to "switch" religions. Because there was a geographic component to Protestantism, supply-side factors also came into play. On the one hand, the new religion faced greater obstacles in societies that practiced primogeniture, which tended to concentrate wealth in fewer hands and encourage rent-seeking behavior from top-tobottom (i.e., among nobles and churchmen alike). On the other, its inroads into the religious marketplace was facilitated in societies that did not practice primogeniture, or in developing urban areas, where wealth was more fluid and less concentrated, and where individual economic opportunity was greater. In an earlier study we showed that for the most part, countries that enforced primogeniture laws retained their rent-seeking practices and remained within the fold of the Catholic Church, whereas those that did not practice primogeniture embraced Protestantism (Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison, 2002) . The countries that embraced Protestantism were marked by rapid urbanization, greater individual accessibility to economic markets and opportunities, and wider dispersion of property and wealth.
Protestants invaded the medieval market for religion by launching a relatively simple strategy that owed its success in part to the economic "excesses" of the medieval Catholic Church. Protestant sects gained members by making "all or none" offers using an uncomplicated pricing scheme that substituted for the highly discriminatory prices of the dominant firm. They were aided by historical, mostly exogenous factors, such as the absence of institutional arrangements that concentrated wealth and the presence of others that dispersed it. Once entry occurred, the Catholic Church could be expected to react in typical fashion. Therefore the questions that we pose in this paper are the following:
What were the effects of market entry on the incumbent firm? How did the medieval Catholic Church react to the new kinds of competition, doctrinally and otherwise?
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION
A simple model serves to clarify our theory of the Counter-Reformation and underscore the (testable) economic implications of Protestantism's entry into the medieval religious market. In Figure 1 Here we assume that Protestantism entered the religion market as a rival monopoly-like firm charging a simple (but different) monopoly price. Its membership (entry) price was cheaper, but not free-a tenpercent "biblical" tithe took the place of the many exactions of the Roman Church. Protestant entry involved, indeed initially required, the use of political power to legitimize the new religions. In 1517 Luther published his Ninety-five Theses. By 1530, after the failure of Emperor Charles V to restore Catholic orthodoxy in Germany, Lutheran princes united in a League against the Emperor and Catholic princes. The freedom and the very lives of Luther and Calvin depended on the protection of secular rulers but, as both discovered, political power can be used against particular religions as well. Nevertheless, both Calvin and Luther espoused action by civil authorities to police "idolatry, sacrilege, blasphemy and other public affronts to religion" (Hopfl 1991: xviii-xix Figure 2 ) may be drawn originating from point B in Figure 2 . Simple monopoly price would be established on the demand curve at the point of intersection between MCc (= MCp) and the residual marginal revenue curve -at a point lower than B, the Protestant entry price, in Figure 2 . This is the first testable implication of our theory.
A second testable implication is that competition will be most intense in the price region near P p . A third testable implication is that, post-entry, the Catholic Church will attempt to extend its own demand curve by increasing the marginal cost of Protestant churches (MC p in Figure 2 ). In order to be taken, this action must be cost-effective, i.e., the marginal revenue of an action must be greater than the attendant marginal costs. For example, the organized suppression of "defectors" by Church-sponsored inquisitions must generate more "revenue" than "costs". We expect more violence where the marginal product of violence is greater.
A fourth testable implication is that, as with any imperfectly competitive firm, the incumbent firm will try to develop policies that will shift BD to the right and make its demand more inelastic (e.g., advertising). Several strategies suggest themselves here:
correcting abuses within the medieval Catholic Church; the development of alternative religious orders that are more resistant to "corruption charges" such as those levied against the Catholic Church by Protestant reformers; and devoting more church resources to charitable endeavors or other means of social support.
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Did the medieval Catholic Church respond to entry by employing strategems that are predictable in light of the theory outlined above? We looked for evidence to support our thesis in the historical documents of the Reformation era, and in the work of respected historians who have specialized in this field. Historical evidence shows that the medieval church responded to market entry on two different levels. On the "retail" side it took actions to raise and transform product demand; whereas on the "wholesale" side, the organizational structure of the Catholic Church acted as an impediment to meaningful reform.
RETAIL ADJUSTMENTS BY THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH
On the retail side, the medieval Catholic Church reacted to competitive entry according to the dictates of economic theory, as explicated above.
Measures by the Incumbent Firm to Lower its Retail Price
The canons and decrees of the Council of Trent (1545-1563) speak clearly to various attempts by the Catholic Church to lower the price (or increase the quality) of its services. 9 The number of decrees on each subject of reform may be taken as a rough indication of the perceived severity of the problem (see Table 1 ). With this in mind, the largest number of decrees was directed at reforming the rules of conduct of the episcopate, including the regulation of benefices. 
Intense Competition around the Entrant's Price
The fact that competition was intense around entry price is demonstrable through a study of the organized violence undertaken by the Catholic Church in response to the threat of Protestantism. 12 There was more vigorous competition where Catholic and Protestant areas were contiguous, as in Belgium and Germany, rather than in Spain or
Italy. Continuous Catholic areas were forced to borrow at competitive market interest rates when usury was eliminated in Protestant countries. For example, it was not the German Catholic cities that were growing between 1500 and 1650, but those outside the Rhineland. Two Belgian cities (Ghent and Bruges) were among the larges in Europe in 1500 but, while remaining relatively prosperous (Ghent remained on the list of Europe's 30 largest in 1650), it is notable that Belgium shares borders with both Protestant
Germany and the Netherlands (Bairoch, Bateau and Chevre 1988) . In those areas contiguous to capitalism, where this and other sorts of competition existed, 13 economic 12 We do not even consider the competition that existed for 800 years between the Roman church and the Eastern Orthodox Church where both groups tried to attract adherents, mainly in the Balkans. 13 The kind of religious "tourism" in the two Germanys in the post-Reformation area -specifically the addition of more religious shrines and labor-free "feast days" in Catholic Germany -provides additional evidence that Catholics were trying to lure former members back to the Church (Nolan and Nolan 1989 : 87, Table 4 -2).
growth and institutional developments were similar as well. 14 At the same time that the Catholic Church composed its reform program through the actions of the Council of Trent, it began to crack down on defectors through an institutionalized program of violence, the chief form of which was the dreaded Inquisition. Other forms of suppression -in effect, raising rivals costs --were exercised through the Index (a form of censorship of books and ideas), and the suppression of "technology" (i.e., censorship of music, art and science)the most famous episode involving Galileo's treatment by the Catholic Church was pale compared to the burning of Giordano Bruno by the Roman inquisition. His crime: the advocacy of Copernican principles in forming theories of an infinite universe and the suggestion that other "earths" might exist in the cosmos (see below). These same measures can also be viewed as attempts by the incumbent firm to raise the costs to defectors of joining a rival religion. Hence a more detailed discussion of particular repressive measures is deferred to the next section.
Measures by the Incumbent Firm to Raise Rivals' Costs
In certain respects, the medieval Catholic Church's reaction to Protestant entry was analogous to the reaction of business firms to "regulated" competition, or to the tendency of special interests to seek protective trade legislation. In such cases, incumbent firms seek to protect their market power by raising rivals' costs. In the medieval context, the "rivals" were, on the one hand, the new Protestant sects (Lutherans, Anglicans, Calvinists, etc.), and on the other, the new "heretics" from the scientific and 15 Although the interrelationships between religion, science and art are complex, the growth of science and the spirit of "rationalism" that accompanied it in the sixteenth century were often viewed as a challenge to the authority of the medieval church, which confronted this challenge by employing tools of censorship and repression. Even the in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Catholic Church eyed suspiciously the reintroduction of classical philosophy and the reawakening of classical aesthetics as "pagan" reincarnations. The invention of the printing press presented new opportunities for science and art as well as for the church (to advertise, for example). In astronomy, the clash between orthodox ideas and the new theories of Copernicus (1543), and later, Galileo, was seen by the Catholic Church as a direct challenge to its interpretation of Holy Scripture. Moreover, some of the most important art of the period, such as the work of Botticelli and Carravaggio, reflected the melding of the rationalist spirit with traditional Christianity (or possibly a pagan interpretation of it). Art historians remain divided over the meaning of the imagery of Sandro Botticelli's Primavera (circa 1475-1478). Ostensibly a secular work about springtime, its complex imagery has strongly suggested a "pagan" interpretation to some. During the late fifteenth century, as the horrors of the Black Death receded into the past, Catholicism tempered its spirit of hellfire and damnation. Bireley (1999: 18-19) , for example, suggests that there is much debate over the proposition that "fear" infiltrated late medieval Christianity wherein, as some authors contend, "fear of death, judgment, the end of the world, and Satan, permeated late medieval religion, provoking anxiety about salvation and an agitated spirit." It is more likely that this feature of human life created a cyclical level of elasticity amongst the faithful. In short, the vagaries of human life were an "exogenous" feature of the "demand for assurances of
There is multi-correlation between the invention of printing, the emergence of Protestantism and the on-going development of science over this period. Outside Rome the Inquisition was focused on Protestantism at the borders of its influence. For example, near Trieste at the end of the sixteenth century the Inquisition eternal salvation." During less perilous times, as when the Black Death and other plagues waned during the later medieval period, demand became more elastic as death became less immediate, which allowed Christianity to be portrayed as a doctrine of God's mercy and love. Later, when Protestantism mounted a serious challenge to the Roman Catholic monopoly, repression and damnation returned to vogue. The emphasis on hell and damnation was, observationally, an attempt to make the demand for salvation through Catholic processes more "inelastic." This changing spirit is also reflected in the art of the time, e.g., Michelangelo's Last Judgment (1536-1541), undertaken as the initial wave of Reformation was overtaking many parts of Europe.
16 Burman (1984:176) maintains that Galileo was punished less for his scientific statements than for his "offenses against the inquisition" and his challenge to orthodox Jesuit astronomers. Lest we forget, the Roman Inquisition was equally harsh in its treatment of artists. The Venetian painter Paolo Veronese was hauled before the Roman Inquisition to defend his painting Feast in the House of Levi in which he had placed dogs, dwarfs, a fool, a parrot, men with German weapons and a man with a bleeding nose. Since such details were not mentioned in the biblical story of Levi the church regarded these extraneous elements as heretical. To placate the inquisitors Veronese reworked his canvas at his own expense, eliminating the offending elements. According to Sir Anthony Blunt, a noted authority on medieval and Renaissance art, "it is typical of the methods of the Counter-Reformation that the Inquisition in this case was satisfied with certain changes of detail which left the painting exactly as worldly in feeling as it was before" (cited in Burman 1984:168) . Despite the infamy and persistent embarrassment to the Church of such episodes, the Roman Inquisition persisted in existence until 1965, when the Holy Office was formally abolished in favor of the "Congregation for the Doctrines of the Faith". aimed at suppressing Lutheranism. Some of the most virulent inquisitions against Protestants were in Spain. Ships crews, especially from England, were at extreme risk.
According to Burman (1984: 201) "Henry Gottersum, the cook of the Elizabeth that anchored at Puerto de Santa Maria in 1574, was burned alive for admitting that he was a convinced Protestant." Inquisitors seized cargoes, confiscated books, and arrested sailors, who were sentenced to the Spanish galleys for "religious crimes." The physical torture meted out by the Spanish Inquisition has been well documented. But the Inquisition employed mental torture as well, as was global in its reach. Speaking of French practice, Foucault (1977: 40) notes that the torture imposed by the Inquisition was "a regulated practice, obeying a well-defined procedure…. The first degree of torture was the sight of the instruments." The ensuing degrees of torture assumed an array of methods: the ordeal of water, the ordeal of fire, the strappado, the wheel, the rack and the stivaletto-all used to break alleged heretics. Torture, or even the prospect of torture, under a legal system that bestowed vast power on the Catholic Church, was a particularly vivid means of raising the cost of membership in a rival sect.
Measures by the Incumbent Firm to Enhance Demand
In order to counter entry by rivals, incumbent firms often seek to boost demand for their product and insure brand loyalty by advertising. Although the practice of advertising tends to follow the technology of the day, the concept is very old. There is evidence that the medieval Catholic Church recognized very early the necessity of advertising (and differentiating) its product. Early forms of advertising by the medieval church were both informative and persuasive. Preaching and instruction could hardly avoid the kind of advertising designed to inculcate "brand loyalty". This kind of action seemed even more imperative in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. On June 17, 1546, the Council of Trent (5 th :I:24) formalized its emphasis on advertising when it …ordained and decreed that in those churches in which there exists a prebend or a benefice with an obligation attached, or other income by whatever name it may be known, set aside for instructors in sacred theology, the bishops, archbishops, primates, and other ecclesiastical superiors of those localities compel, even by a reduction of their revenues, those who hold such prebend, benefice or income, to expound and interpret the Holy Scriptures, either personally if they are competent, otherwise by a competent substitute to be chosen by the program of reform by the Roman Catholic Church in response to Protestant entry, but the extent to which the medieval church actually implemented its proclaimed reforms is a matter that is difficult to resolve with any historical finality. Whereas the Church's 17 According to Foss (1969:157) : "The results of the Council of Trent were very pleasing, and very important, to the Jesuits. The universality of the Church and the primacy of the pope had been stressed. The need for theChurch to become active, preaching and teaching, was acknowledged. The Jesuits' place in the Catholic structure, as noteworthy preachers and the possessors of the finest educational system in Europe, was secured." attempt to clean up its retail operations were transparent, its wholesale actions were much less so. Indeed, attempts to clean up the wholesale side of the Church were ineffective.
In order to understand this failure at the wholesale level, we must first investigate the industrial organization of the medieval Catholic Church.
Two important changes in church organization occurred prior to the Protestant Reformation, and these changes are responsible in large measure for the "failure" of the Counter-Reformation. The first involved the centrality and primacy of the papacy, which shaped the medieval church's political and ecclesiastic policy. The second involved the progressive "Italianization" of the College of Cardinals, the curia, and the papacy itself, which eventually resulted in an Italian monopoly of the Vatican.
The Threat of the Conciliar Form of Church Governance
The monopoly structure of the papacy, which reached a high point in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, faced repeated challenges thereafter. 18 In the Middle Ages the Holy See was an important city-state in world politics as well as a dominant-firm, global supplier of religious services. On the religious front, as we have seen, the Catholic Church confronted an ongoing spirit of religious reform throughout the medieval period.
On the political front, it was wracked by the Great Schism of 1378, which led to competing claims on the papacy by French and Italian prelates, and the relocation of the 18 According to most historians, papal dominance reached its apex under Innocent III (1198-1216), under whose papacy Rome became the center of the legal and religious machinery of the church, excising dominion over clergy and (often) dictating the policies of lay rulers (Hill 1970: 145 et passim) . The nadir of papal influence came about 100 years later. Pressing his power, Innocent III's Fourth Lateran Council (1215) denied the authority of monarchs and other lay rulers to tax the clergy. But the economic strains of war were too much for most monarchs. By 1296 France and England were at war, both taxing church properties for war finance. Boniface VIII issued a bull (Clericis Laicos) that denied lay rulers absolute authority in their own kingdoms and cut off their access to church funds via taxation. When Phillip IV of France resisted, Boniface planned to issue a decree of excommunication against him, but French mercenaries led a small army against the Pope, causing him to capitulate (Boniface died a few weeks after, and two later popes renounced their authority over Phillip and France). On these matters, including documents that accompany the dispute, see Tierney (1964:172-190 (Hay 1977:26) . Only when the rift was healed did the papacy return to Rome.
The Great Schism had two prominent effects on the medieval Catholic Church. On the one hand it reawakened sentiment for the conciliar form of governance, and on the other, it ushered in a system of bribes and side-payments by popes intent on maintaining power.
Re-establishment of the conciliar form of church governance--which had been the hallmark of the first millenium of church history--therefore received added impetus from internal strife within the medieval church. Before the looming threat of Protestantism appeared, religious reform movements emanated, in the main, from church councils.
Indeed, the Council of Constance (1414), ended the Great Schism by reasserting the doctrine of conciliar supremacy. 19 However, sitting popes were not likely to give up their authority so easily, and in the end, the doctrine that popes were subject to properly convoked general church councils received little more than lip service. Despite a decree by the Council of Constance that church councils be called at regular intervals, Pope 19 "The crisis of 1378 was a striking instance of the condition for which conciliarism…was a drastic remedy. The senior clergy who in 1414 faced the scandal of three popes accepted the notion that Christ's purposes were reflected in the whole church as represented in a council" (Hay 1977:32) .
Martin V (1417-1431), as well as his successors, did everything they could to discourage them. 20 A conciliar form of church governance would have distributed ecclesiastic authority more even geographically and the power of the council would have been anterior to that of the pope--a prospect no papal monopolist or aspiring papal monopolist could be expected to embrace.
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Papal Bribes
Many different "side-payments" were offered by the papacy in order to avoid calling councils that might weaken papal control over doctrine and over church revenues.
Before the Reformation these side payments performed the dual functions of keeping the conciliarists at bay and forestalling defections by non-Italian nations, which favored conciliarism. As Bireley (1999: 15) points out:
Rulers, especially the French kings, used the threat of a council to extract concessions from the papacy. Louis XII called a council for Pisa in 1511 in an attempt to counter Pope Julius II's policy towards France in Italy, but the pope outmanoeuvred him. Pope Leo X, then, in the concordat of Bologna of 1516, yielded to Francis I the predominant voice in nearly all the major ecclesiastical appointments in the realm in exchange, in part, for the king's disavowal of conciliarism. Starting with Nicholas V (1447-55), the popes concentrated increasingly on their role as rulers of an Italian state and were themselves elected from aristocratic Italian families.
Clerical appointments were a common concession to France, England and Germany in order to keep them in the fold. 22 Crowder (1977: 23) notes that such side payments were often arranged by "concordats" with nations and rulers:
In a series of concordats the reforms which met their own demands were agreed with each of the French, English and German nations. All were promised better representation among the cardinals. The French were given concessions chiefly from the burden of papal taxation. The English obtained the promise of papal restraint in grants, to monasteries, of exemption from Episcopal jurisdiction and of the appropriation of parish churches. The German concordat had many of the features of the other two, but claimed more explicitly a better representation in a reformed curia than Germans had enjoyed in the past.
As the Protestant Reformation demonstrated, bribes of this sort did not prevent breakaways. There is evidence that the papacy was making higher side payments to some countries as time went on, right up to Protestant entry. Thus, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the papacy did not intervene while England gradually converted papal taxation to royal taxation. Scarisbrick (1960: 50) calculated that the average tax collections from clerical operations in England between 1486 and 1534 resulted in £4,816 per year paid to Rome and £12,500 per year to the King. He concluded that "before the breach, Henry VII and his son were receiving well over two and half times the annual average of money paid to Rome"
In many respects, the successes of the Protestant Reformation may be traced to a failure of side-payments to achieve their desired effect in certain nations such as England, Germany and parts of Switzerland and Scotland. Outside Italy, the pope's main interest was to suppress "heresy," to keep "rebellious" nations within the fold of Catholicism and, of course, to collect rents from downstream church organizations in as many countries as 22 According to Crowder (1977:20) : "By the time of the Great Schism the more influential monarchies of Christendom had established a practical understanding with the papacy for a rough and ready division of their conflicting interests of patronage. Nevertheless this was frequently achieved by contention and adjudication."
possible. 23 These concerns set the stage for the "Italianization" and "Romanization" of the church in an effort to protect the papal monopoly and its declining revenues.
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The Roman-Italian Response
The fifteenth century, which witnessed the dominance of French clergy on the one hand, and the stirrings of "heretical" activity on the other, was pivotal. During this time the Vatican's response to internal and external events was to "circle the wagons" around Italy and, within Italy, around Rome. This process was underway when Luther first mounted his "threat" against Catholicism, and was still in evidence thirty years later when the Council of Trent began. 25 Table 2 shows the extent of Italian dominance of papal conclaves (convocations to elect a pope) between 1431 and 1523.
TABLE 2 ITALIANIZATION OF THE PAPACY BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF TRENT
Date of
It can be seen that the Italianization of the Vatican was proceeding a century before Luther. As the papacy came increasingly under Italian control, it sought to maintain dominance not only by appointing a disproportionate number of Italians to the College of Cardinals but also by increasing the number of cardinals (by two-thirds between 1450 and 1500). The entire field of (thirteen) popes elected after Martin V, the first post-Great Schism pope, was drawn from only nine Italian families. Simultaneously, the Curia, which also expanded over this period, was increasingly made up of Italians.
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Despite the outward appearance of reform given by the Council of Trent, the Italian monopoly in Rome was reluctant to curtail its economic interests. Hallman (1985) gives numerous examples of intensified rent-seeking by the Princes of the Church in the sixteenth century. These activities included nepotism (use of sacred office to aggrandize one's family), simony (the purchase of sacred office), and other financial abuses, such as pluralism of benefices (possession of more than one sacred office), and alienation of property by last will and testament.
Rent Seeking by the Upstream Church After the Council of Trent
By the time the Council of Trent was invoked the evolution of the medieval Catholic Church from the quasi-conciliar forms of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to a Roman-centered, Italian-dominated papal monopoly was virtually complete. Thus, economic as well as spiritual power was concentrated in the hands of a tightly-organized, 26 Hay (1977: 42) also reports the fact that, despite the "contraction of business" over this period, the size of the Curia grew to be roughly between 450 and 500 persons, "of which two-thirds were in the main departments of the camera, the chancery and the penitentiary and the rota, the rest being in the familia (household) and the bodyguard, police and so forth" (42-43). The trend toward Italianization begun in the fifteenth century has continued to this day. Membership in the College of Cardinals, the governing body of the church, increased progressively to a maximum of 70 in 1586 (where it remained until increased further in the 1960s by Pope Paul VI). With the exception of the current pontiff, John Paul II, all popes over the half-millennium since 1526 have been Italian. The only two non-Italians of the preceding century were Alexander VI (1492-1503), a Catalan, and Adrian VI 1522-1526), a Frenchman.
geo-politically homogeneous circle of prelates in Rome. Despite the fact that the financial abuses of this body constituted the proximate cause of Luther's (and others') protests, the members of this circle were naturally eager to protect their economic interests, which centered on control of church property and revenues. One common abuse was nepotism. The 'official' declarations of the Council of Trent took aim at some of the grossest abuses. A major decree (25 th :I:232) prohibited bishops and cardinals from "attempt[s] to enrich their relations or domestics from the revenues of the Church," and further forbade them from giving ecclesiastical properties, "which are from
God," to relatives. However, such measures appear to be mere window dressing.
According to Hallman (1985) , not only did the papal monopoly not follow the admonitions of Trent, the post-Trent abuses flourished beyond previous levels.
Nepotism. Popes of the sixteenth century seized many opportunities to support family and friends from the papal treasury. To cite merely the most egregious instance, in a mere six-year pontificate, Pius IV distributed 334,000 gold scuti from the papal treasury to members of his family, for various purposes unrelated to the provision of church services. 27 According to Hallman (1985: 157) , such practices persisted into the seventeenth century. And Bireley (1999: 65) notes that 'the papacy took on features typical of the seventeenth-century European court, so exhibiting its consonance with the times. Despite attempts of other popes to do so, only at the end of the century, in 1692, 27 Between 1561 and 1565 Pius IV gave 120,000 gold scuti to four nieces (mainly for dowries); 22,000 scuti to his nephews; 10,000 scuti to his brother; and more than 100,000 scuti to other relatives. On his deathbed in 1565 he gave 100,000 gold scuti to his nephew, Count Annibale d'Altemps, to whom he had also granted an annulment of marriage so that d'Altemps could marry Pius's niece, thirteen-year-old Ortensia Borromeo. We do not know if, or how, d'Altemps and his young bride were blood related, but the possibility raises numerous questions about dual standards for the privileged versus the "faithful".
did Innocent XII take effective measures against nepotism." While these practices were (weakly) defended by assertions that Italians were acting as the "good signore" by taking care of relatives, there is small doubt that these practices were at the expense of the church.
Simony. Popes and cardinals also sold secular and "honorary" offices with new vigor after the Council of Trent. A popular device for raising money through the sale of offices involved the "college of knights", a papal creation that offered membership for a high admission fee. Pius IV created the largest college of all, the Cavalieri Pii, "in 1560, with a total of 535 offices [sold] at 500 scuti of gold each" (Hallman 1985: 131) . The buyer received an immediate elevation in social rank. Often the members who bought into these groups were Italian bankers who were well connected with the Vatican. The interlocking of economic and spiritual power was so concentrated that by the end of the sixteenth century a mere nine Italian banking families dominated the College of Cardinals. Expanding the political and economic realm of the Papal States also required governors, administrators and soldiers-thereby providing more patronage opportunities to the pope. Cardinals divided these offices up as so much booty, and "by 1550 it was customary that each cardinal should possess at least one" which could be sold to the highest bidder (Hallman 1985: 139) .
Other Financial Abuses. A major element of Luther's attack on the church focused on "property crimes"-i.e., personal aggrandizement by the alienation of church property and wealth to individual benefit. In short, Luther attacked the Church as an instrument of rent seeking. But while some prelates recognized the problems within the Church and supported reforms that promised to reverse the swelling tide of protest, the "property crimes" denounced by reformers continued unabated after Protestant entry occurred. 28 The Cardinals ignored exhortations by the Council of Trent against long-term rentals of church property. In 1616, "twenty four of the thirty abbeys belonging to
Cardinal Scipione Borghese were rented out," and by the end of the century long-term rentals and other alienations in return for present income were common (Hallman 1985: 79) . One way of alienating church property was by last will and testament. In such instances, …the money disappeared permanently into the coffers of private families…as luxuries increased in Rome, so too did the sums of money churchmen were allowed to bequeath…. The incomes of our ecclesiastical rentiers were being diverted into the hands of lay rentiers, who were transforming the social fabric of Italy by buying their way into the nobility…. As for last wills and testaments, they, like rental agreements, pensions, and other practices, became so customary that they were sanctioned by canon law. The privilege of bequeathing church money…now accompanies the red hat as a matter of course (Hallman 1985: 94) .
Another common abuse ostensibly outlawed by the Council of Trent was the holding of multiple benefices by a single bishop or cardinal. 29 The possession of multiple benefices meant that cardinals and bishops were, in effect, always absent from some of their spiritual charges, since they could not be in residence simultaneously in more than one place. Once more, the admonitions of Trent were disregarded. Calculating the incidence of multiple benefices held by cardinals and bishops before Trent, Hallman
found that approximately 90 percent of the prelates were "double-dipping," or worse.
Cardinal Farnese, Vice Chancellor of the Roman Church during the convocation of the Council of Trent, for example, held no less than 64 separate benefices simultaneously.
28 Hallman (1985:1) points out that the abuses Luther cited in his Address to the Nobility of the German Nation of 1520 were practically the same as those identified in Pope Paul III's reform commission of 1537. 29 The secular meaning of benefice is a feudal estate in land. In ecclesiastical parlance, it is a form of preferment (e.g., endowment) that provides a living for a prelate. By holding multiple benefices, these high clerics were opportunistically usurping resources of the church to their own use.
Comparable data during the post-Trent period are more difficult to come by, but Hallman (1985: 43) concluded that "the years of reform did nothing to alter the practice of gathering together packages of benefices and conferring them as a whole... If anything this practice probably increased with the years. And when vacancies were in short supply 'expectative graces' were granted."
30
The weight of historical research on the subject demonstrates that the wholesale side of the medieval church not only resisted actual and effective reform in the wake of the Protestant Reformation; it succeeded in conducting "business as usual", shielded from view by the cloak of secrecy that enshrouded the Vatican. Patronage, nepotism, and simony all intensified, made possible by the "re-monopolization" of the Roman-Italian
Church after the Great Schism of the fourteenth century. While some in the Catholic Church recognized the need for genuine reforms on the wholesale side, the serpentine Roman bureaucracy, entrenched in its power for at least a century before the Council of Trent, defied actual reform at the wholesale level of church organization.
CONCLUSION
The Protestant Reformation can be best understood as a reaction to perceived abuses at the "retail" and "wholesale" levels of the Catholic Church, whereas the Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation may be viewed as the response of an incumbent monopoly firm to entry, either actual or threatened, by a rival firm. In the wake of the Protestant
Reformation the average price of the "Z-good" called religious services (or assurances of salvation) was lowered because the Catholic Church could no longer practice price discrimination in the upper reaches of the demand curve. 31 The Catholic Church also engaged in vigorous competition with new entrants to retain members and prevent "converts" to the new religion, using violence and repression to increase the cost to individuals of defecting to a rival religion. Protestant entry clearly increased the incentives for the Catholic Church to maintain demand and, hopefully, to shift the demand curve for its services rightward.
The Council of Trent provides historians with a written record of the Catholic Church's official reaction to the threat of entry, and is therefore vital to understanding the achievements and failures of the Counter-Reformation. Reforms of the Council of Trent permitted at least the "advertised" cleaning up of abuses at the retail level of church organization, 32 actions apparently sufficient to maintain regional memberships in the Catholic Church and to prevent further attrition from Roman Catholicism. But the Council also addressed clerical abuses at the "wholesale" level, issuing many decrees designed to bring "errant" nations and Protestants back into the fold. Prices did fall to adherents but the Church attempted to support demand by increasing non-price competition as well. Both before and after the Protestant Reformation the Roman papal apparatus found it necessary to make side payments to church and state officials in other countries to "keep them in the fold". 31 The fact that the Church practiced price discrimination is well established, for example, in "price lists" for papal indulgences (for examples see Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison 2002) . 32 There is no reason to believe that certain of the "retail" products of the church that dealt with "social services" did not continue and flourish before and after the Protestant reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. Geremek (1994) and Pullen (1971) show that between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries the Catholic Church's activities provided models for Protestant charitable organization. The Council of Trent (7th:XV:61) directed church officials to carefully monitor the management practices of hospital administrators.
The Reformation may in part be viewed as a consequence of the failure of "side payments" to keep certain countries beholden to the Italian cartel. In the end, however, the side payments bestowed on governmental and church interests were insufficient to maintain the universality of the Catholic Church's monopoly. For its part, the CounterReformation may be seen as an attempt to restructure side payments to keep the remaining parts of the Catholic Church together. Concessions, including financial concessions, made to French monarchs such as Francis II and to aristocrats in several nations appear to bear this out. These concessions, however, were insufficient in distribution and amount to bring Protestant nations, such as England and Germany, back to the fold.
In the final analysis, the Catholic Church's response to Protestantism, in practice as well as appearance, failed to clean up the "wholesale" side of church operations or to broaden participation in the catholic version of Christian religion. The "sins of the fathers" in the form of blatant venality must have been obvious to Protestants and Catholics alike. Rampant abuses of church property continued at ever-increasing levels in the sixteenth-century. A part--perhaps a large part--of the failure of the CounterReformation to re-establish a "universal" church must be placed at the door of the organizational defects that allowed such venality to continue.
